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DANIEL  J.  MELTZER*
Over  fifteen  years  ago,  Paul Bator taught  me  federal  courts,  but he  did
so  much more than  that;  he kindled  a fascination  in that  subject that  I've
never  lost.  Paul's  teaching,  his  writing,  his  whole  person  displayed  an
enviable  set of gifts:  analytical power mixed with broad  vision; a search  for
principle  informed  by  worldly  realities;  and  a  masterful  use  of  language,
blending  informality,  pungency,  and  elegance,  that  gave  pleasure  as  it
reinforced  his  argument.  His  approach  to  a  problem  always  commanded
respect,  even when one did not fully  agree.  I shall  deeply miss  him and  the
distinctive  voice  he possessed.
The  Constitution as Architecture is  an apt  title not  only  for this  lecture,
but  also  for much  of Paul's work.  His  consistent  concern  was  with  insti-
tutional  structures:  with  their  grace,  their  practicality,  their sense  of pro-
portion,  and  their fit with broader  aspects of the legal  environment.
With  characteristic  force and polish,  this lecture steers us away from dead
ends,  while  offering  a prescription-that  article III  review  of the  decisions
of non-article  III  federal tribunals  is  a constitutionally  adequate vesting  of
the judicial power-with  which I substantially  agree.  But there remain some
difficult questions  about  the meaning  and implications  of his position,  four
of which  I would like to  discuss.
I.
The  first  question  concerns  the reach  of congressional  power.  Paul notes
that  early  on,  courts  martial  and  territorial  courts,  staffed  by  untenured
judges,
developed  in response to special institutional needs,  under circumstances
where  it  was  the  considered  judgment  of  the  legislature  that  it  was
inappropriate  and inexpedient to have to choose between leaving a matter
to  the state  courts  on  the  one  hand,  or, on  the other,  to  commit it  to
a regular  federal  tribunal.'
*  Professor  of Law, Harvard  Law  School.  J.D.,  1975,  A.B.,  1972,  Harvard  University.
Dick  Fallon  and  David Shapiro  gave  me  useful  comments  on a  draft,  and,  more  generally,
have  helped  clarify  my thinking  about  this subject-though  neither fully  agrees  with  what I
have to say  here.  Mike  Dorf provided  helpful research  assistance.
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I  am  less  persuaded  than  he  that  there  exist  strong  instrumental  justifi-
cations  for  the  full  range  of  jurisdiction  exercised  by  courts  martial  or
territorial  courts.
2
I  raise  the  point  not  to  quibble  about  the  raisons d'Otre of particular
tribunals  that  must today  be  taken  as  established,  but  rather  to  open  up  a
question  about  the  limits  of  legislative  authority.  Congress  may  constitu-
tionally  create  non-article  III tribunals,  Paul  argues,  so long  as  "it  can  be
demonstrated  that there is  a reasoned basis  for the judgment that dispensing
with  article  III restrictions  has an  appropriate  and  valid purpose  connected
with  the  achievement  of a  valid  legislative  program." 3  He  adds  that it  is  a
"huge  intellectual  and  political  mistake"  to  think  of  that  formulation  as
meaningless,  for  it  would  prohibit  "[w]holesale  transfers  of jurisdiction ' 4
whose  sole purpose  is to  destroy the protections  of article  III. Beyond that,
article  III  constitutes  an  important  psychological  constraint,  as  evidenced,
he  says,  by  Congress'  never  having tried  to subvert  the independence of the
judiciary.
I  suspect  that  judicial  independence  is  less  likely  to  be  subverted  by
"wholesale  transfers  of  jurisdiction"  or  by  a  Congress  with  destructive
intent than  by the accretion  of measures,  each of which creates  a significant
jurisdiction in  a non-article  III tribunal.'  This last prospect  is not  "chimer-
ical," 6  in  my  view,  in  light  of continuing  concern  about  the  workload  of
article  III  courts,  as  well  as  the  possibility,  in  an  era  of powerful  interest
groups,  that particular  matters might  be assigned to  non-article  III tribunals
for the purpose  of advancing  a  specific  agenda.7
2.  See,  e.g.,  E.  CHEMERINSIY,  FEDERAL JURISDICTION  §§  4.2-4.3  (1989);  M.  REDISH,
FEDERAL  JURISDICTION:  TENSIONS  IN  THE  ALLOCATION  OF  POWER  36-40  (1980).
3.  Bator,  supra note  1, at 258.
4.  Id.
5.  See Commodity  Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S.  833,  866  (1986)  (Brennan,
J.,  dissenting).  See generally Youngstown  Sheet  & Tube Co.  v. Sawyer,  343  U.S.  579,  593-94
(1952)  (Frankfurter,  J.,  concurring).  It is  a fair,  though not  complete,  answer to  note that the
Constitution's  capacity  to  accommodate  gradual  governmental  change  can  be  viewed  as  a
strength,  rather  than  a  weakness,  of  our  political  system.  Compare Strauss,  Formal and
Functional  Approaches to Separation-of-Powers  Questions-A Foolish  Inconsistency?, 72  COR-
NELL  L.  REV.  488,  523  (1987)  (so  arguing)  with  Bator,  supra note  1,  at  233  (noting  the
problematic  nature  of "the  neo-Darwinian  concept  that whatever  wins  is  right").
6.  See Bator,  supra note  1, at 258.
7.  Paul recognizes  that such  a purpose underlay creation  of the National  Labor  Relations
Board.  Bator,  supra note  1, at  238.
As  recent  debates  over  judicial  appointments  suggest,  the political  branches may  also  try to
staff article III courts to  further  a particular  ideology.  But a large  shift  in the attitudes  of the
article  III  judiciary,  with  more  than  700  members  enjoying  life  tenure,  see 28  U.S.C.  §§  44,
133  (1982),  requires  a  combination  of political  continuity,  executive  determination,  lack  of
strong  resistance  in  the Senate,  and  a large  number  of vacancies.  "Stacking"  a commission
with a small number  of members  who  enjoy  limited  terms is considerably  easier,  especially  at
its creation,  when  all  seats  are  vacant.
Of course,  specialized  article  III  courts  can  more  easily  be  stacked,  particularly  at  their
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Suppose  that  over  time  Congress  vastly increased  the number  of magis-
trates and the scope of their duties.  The purpose would hardly be to destroy
article  III  courts,  but  rather  to  provide  them  with  assistance  needed  to
exercise their traditional jurisdiction without increasing the corps of tenured
judges-a  prospect  to  be  avoided  either  (a)  because  it  would  dilute  the
quality  and  prestige of the article  III judiciary,  or (b)  because  the increase
in workload  may be temporary.8
Plainly  one could  not find  that measure to  be irrational  or ill-motivated,
but I would  find it  a troubling  one.  Magistrates  offer  only  the  advantage
of workload  reduction,  rather  than  expert,  efficient,  and  consistent
adjudication9  or  the  ability  to  combine  rulemaking  and  adjudication  in
service of a regulatory agenda. 1 0  I tend to  agree with  others"  that workload
reduction  is  not  reason  enough,  particularly  since  Congress  always  retains
the option of reducing  federal  court  dockets  by transferring  matters  to the
state  courts.'2
To be sure,  the decisions  of the magistrates  would presumably  be subject
to judicial  review by article III judges;  we can assume that legal  conclusions
inception,  but also  thereafter.  Specialized  courts have fewer  judges  than the generalist  district
courts  and courts  of appeals,  and it is  easier  to  identify  a nominee's  likely  predisposition  as
to a  narrow  set  of issues.  See R.  PosNER,  THE  FEDERAL  CoURTs  153-54  (1985).  Still,  article
III poses  a serious  obstacle to efforts to  stack  even a  specialized court,  by restricting  political
power  over  existing  appointees  while  simultaneously  (by  virtue  of  life  tenure)  limiting  the
opportunities  for  new  appointments.
8. See  Note,  Article  III Constraints and the  Expanding Civil Jurisdiction of Federal
Magistrates: A  Dissenting  View,  88  YALE  L.J.  1023,  1048-49  (1979)  [hereinafter  Note,  Con-
straints].
9.  See Crowell v. Benson, 285  U.S. 22, 46-47 (1932)  (highlighting the distinctive advantages
of administrative  rather than judicial determination  of compensation awards).
10.  See Breyer,  Judicial  Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38  Am&fIN.  L.  Rav.  363,
368 (1986);  Fallon,  Of Legislative Courts,  Administrative  Agencies, and Article III, 101  HARv.
L.  REv.  915,  935  (1988);  Sunstein,  Constitutionalism  After the New Deal, 101  HARv.  L.  REv.
421  (1987).
11.  See,  e.g.,  Whitten,  Consent, Caseload, and Other Justifications  for Non-Article III
Courts and Judges: A  Comment on  Commodity  Futures  Trading  Commission  v.  Schor,  20
CREIGaHoN L.  REv.  1,  18,  34-37  (1986-87);  Note,  Constraints,  supra note  8, at  1055-56 n.181.
12.  This  suggestion may  sound doctrinaire and divorced  from reality if, as  may be true in
some locales,  most litigants  would prefer  federal magistrates to state court judges.  But I  don't
believe  that  article  III  makes  Congress'  power  to  deploy  non-article  III  tribunals  dependent
on whether  they would prevail,  in a popularity  poll,  over  the clearly constitutional  alternative
of  state court  adjudication.  Moreover,  as  I  suggest  below,  nothing  should  prevent  Congress
from permitting  the use of magistrates  or other non-article  III bodies  with the actual  consent
of the litigants.  See infra text accompanying  notes 21-23.
One  might also  question how  great is the risk of interference  by the political  branches  with
decisions  by  federal  magistrates,  who  are  appointed  by  and  under  the  supervision  of  the
judicial  branches.  Yet  I  think  Justice  Brennan's  opinion  in  Northern Pipeline, despite  its
manifold  difficulties,  was  correct  when  it  described  the  tenure  and  salary  protections  as
designed  in part to promote  public confidence,  attract  high quality  lawyers to  the bench,  and
shield  against  pressures  originating  within  as  well  as  outside  of  the  judicial  branch.  See
Northern  Pipeline Constr.  Co.  v.  Marathon  Pipe Line  Co.,  458  U.S.  50,  59  n.10 (1982).  See
generally Note,  Constraints,  supra note 8.
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would  be  reviewed  de  novo,  and  fact-findings  at  least  for  substantial
evidence.  But  neither  Paul  nor  other  commentators 3  have  suggested  that
factual  questions  resolved by  non-article  III  decisionmakers  must generally
be reviewed for more than substantial  evidence.' 4 The assumption that article
III judges  would  always  conscientiously  review  magistrates'  decisions  (par-
ticularly  when  magistrates  are  deployed  to  lighten  the  judges'  workload)
may be  a heroic  one.  And even on that assumption,  magistrates  would  have
acquired  broad  power  to  resolve  finally  many important  factual  disputes.
We  must  remember  that  litigators,  unlike  most  academics,  tend  to  view
factual  issues  as  decisive,
15  and  that  many  discretionary  aspects  of  a  trial
judge's  duties  are effectively  immune  from appellate  review. 6
To take a different example,  suppose Congress,  over time,  created a large
number  of specialized  article I courts.  If the purpose  were to preserve article
III  judges  as  generalists  while  reaping  the  advantages  of  specialization  in
particular  areas,  again  Congress  could  hardly  be  said  to  have  acted  irra-
tionally.  But  even  with  provision for  broad  review  in article  III courts,  the
prospect is  quite  a troubling  one,  for  similar reasons.
Justice White's dissent in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co. offered  a different  view:  "the  very  fact  of extreme  special-
ization  may  be  enough  . . . to justify the  creation of a legislative  court. '"'7
Noting that  the federal judiciary is,  "on  the whole,  a body of generalists,"
he  argued  that  "[t]he  addition  of several  hundred  specialists  may  substan-
tially change, whether for good or bad, the character of the federal bench.' 8
The argument does not strike me as a powerful one.  Though both specialized
and  generalist  judges  would  inhabit  the  world  of article  III,  by  definition
they would be assigned  different responsibilities,  and it is not clear how the
presence of specialists on one court would change the character of generalists
on  another.  Various  kinds  of provisions  might  establish  a  desirable  sepa-
ration  between  the two  groups-for  example,  differential  salaries,  or  rules
that  specialists  and  generalists  may  not  sit by  designation  on  each  other's
courts.  Uncertainty  about  the  workload  of specialized  courts  can  be  dealt
with,  at least in part, by provisions that vacancies  need not be automatically
13.  See,  e.g.,  L.  JAFE,  JUDICIAL  CONTROL  OF  ADMINISTRATIVE  ACTION  595-623  (1965);
Fallon, supra note  10, at 986-91;  Monaghan,  Marbury and the Administrative  State, 83 COLum.
L.  REv.  1, 29  & n.173  (1983).
14.  I  put  to  one  side  much-criticized  suggestions  that  broader  review  is  required  of
"constitutional"  and  "jurisdictional"  factfindings.  See  generally Monaghan,  Constitutional
Fact Review,  85  COLUM.  L.  REv.  229  (1985).
15.  See  Speiser  v.  Randall,  357  U.S.  513,  520  (1958);  L.  JAFFE,  supra note  13,  at  89;
Monaghan,  supra note  14,  at 255  n.141;  see also J.  FRANK,  LAW  AND  THE  MODERN  MIND
(6th printing  1970).
16.  See,  e.g.,  Geras  v.  Lafayette  Display  Fixtures,  Inc.,  742  F.2d  1037,  1049  (7th  Cir.
1984)  (Posner,  J.,  dissenting).
17.  458 U.S.  50,  118  (1982)  (White,  J.,  dissenting).
18.  Id.
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filled.  There  are many  ways to  establish  article  III courts  staffed by judges
with tenure and salary protection, 9 and the justifications for departing  from
article  III  must be measured  against the  plausible  options  within  it. There
are,  of course,  reasons  to question the  desirability  of specialized  article  III
courts,  not the  least  of which  is  the  fear  that  specialized  courts  are more
subject to political influence,  particularly over judicial appointments.20  Con-
cern  about political  influence,  however,  must be greater  still in  the case  of
specialized  tribunals  whose judges  lack  tenure and salary  protection.
Thus,  I fear that acceptance  of Paul's standard-under  which broad  use
of both magistrates  and specialized  non-article  III  courts  would  pass  mus-
ter-would give Congress  too  much  power to legislate  around  article  III.  I
suggest,  instead,  that it  is  appropriate  for  courts  considering  the  constitu-
tionality  of congressional  action  to  consider  the  strength  of the legislative
purpose  in  creating  a tribunal  outside  of  article  III.  Such  an  approach  is
not  unlike  that  advocated  by  Justice Harlan  in Glidden Co.  v.  Zdanok,21
where  he  called  for  judicial  scrutiny  of  the  "particular  local  setting,  the
practical  necessities,  and  the  possible  alternatives. ' 222  Paul  criticizes  that
kind of approach  as involving balancing that is "open-ended  and necessarily
subjective." 23  Since this  is  not the  place to try to  respond  fully  to charac-
teristic criticisms of balancing, I will simply note my own view that intelligent
and candid  decisionmaking  often  demands  some  kind  of balancing,  which
(like  most  any  approach  to  the  adjudication  of  challenging  questions)
admittedly  leaves  considerable  room for  differing judgments.2
19.  See  Bankruptcy Act  Revision: Hearings Before  the Subcomm.  on  Civil and Const.
Rights of the Comm.  on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32,
94th Cong.,  2d  Sess.  2697  (1976)  (letter of Paul J.  Mishkin).
20.  See R.  POSNER,  supra note 7, at  153-54.
21.  370  U.S.  530  (1962)  (plurality opinion).
22.  Id. at 547-48.  Justice  Harlan's statement was made  in the context  of courts  exercising
jurisdiction  for  a  transitory  period,  but  the  standard  he  suggested  strikes  me  as  just  as
applicable  to more  permanent  tribunals.
23.  Bator, supra note  1, at 257.
24.  For  a  thorough  discussion  of  the  standard  objections  to  balancing,  see  Aleinikoff,
Constitutional  Law  in  the Age  of Balancing, 96  YAr  L.J.  943  (1987).  For  a  thoughtful
response to  general criticisms  of balancing that is  sensitive  to its potential  pitfalls,  see  Coffin,
Judicial  Balancing: The Protean Scales of Justice, 63  N.Y.U.  L.  REv.  16  (1988).
I  should  add  that  my  endorsement  of  judges'  evaluating  the  force  of  the  legislative
justification  for assigning  matters to an article I tribunal  does not  extend to the multi-factored
balancing  approach  found  in  the  Court's  recent  legislative  courts  decisions.  Those  decisions
attend  to  a  far  larger  number  of  ill-defined  and  often  irrelevant  variables,  including:  (1)
whether the right  originates in state or federal  law, see  Commodity Futures  Trading  Comm'n
v.  Schor,  478 U.S.  833,  851  (1986);  (2) whether the right  displaces a pre-existing  common law
right, see Thomas v.  Union  Carbide Agric.  Prods.  Co.,  473  U.S.  568,  587  (1985);  (3) whether
the matter  involves  "public  rights,"  see id. at 588-89 (a term  whose emptiness,  as used by the
Court,  Paul  amply  demonstrates);  and  (4)  whether  the  tribunal  possesses  certain  "judicial
powers"  such as the authority  to issue  declaratory judgments,  see Northern Pipeline,  458 U.S.
at 85  (opinion of Brennan,  J.).
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Paul  offers  a  different  objection  to balancing:  if Congress  is  required  to
use  constitutional  courts,  the  Court cannot  balance that requirement  away,
but  if Congress  has power  to use  non-article  III  tribunals,  then the  exercise
of that power  can be invalidated  only if Congress'  judgment was arbitrary.Y
In favoring  the second  view,  he reminds me of Justice Frankfurter's position
in  the  Dennis case-that  the  Court  was  not  justified  in  substituting  its
judgment  for that of Congress  in  weighing  the  competing  concerns  of free
speech  and national  security.2 6  By  contrast,  I think  it is  no  less  appropriate
here  than in  free  speech  cases  for courts  to protect  enduring  constitutional
values  likely  to  be  given  inadequate  weight  by  the  political  branches. 27
Indeed,  in my view  the hard  question is not whether  the courts  will second-
guess  Congress  too  much,  as  Paul  seems  to  fear,  but  rather  too  little.2 8
Nonetheless,  I  believe  the  kind  of judicial  scrutiny  that  Justice  Harlan
described would  provide a needed  limitation  on the admittedly broad power
of Congress to assign matters in the first instance to non-article III tribunals.
II.
I  turn  next  to  the  relationship  of the  due  process  clause  and  article  III
as  sources  of a right  to  judicial  review.  Dissenting  in  Crowell v.  Benson,29
Justice  Brandeis  argued that  due process  was the  exclusive source of a right
to judicial  review.30  Paul comes  close  to  endorsing that position,  suggesting
that  article  III  does  not  add  anything  to  the  right  of  review  provided  by
the  due  process  clause.3  He  also  says  that  he  does  "not  think  that  the
distinction  [between  article III  and  due process]  is  substantive.
3 2  My own
view  is  that  the  distinction  does  matter  in  one  important  respect,  for the
constitutional  requirement  of due process  applies  to the states  as  well  as  to
the  federal  government,  while  article  III  (and,  more  generally,  the  Consti-
tution's  scheme  of separation  of powers)  does  not govern  the  organization
of state judiciaries  or  state  governments. 3
25.  Bator,  supra note  1, at  257-58.
26.  Dennis  v.  United  States,  341  U.S.  494,  525-26  (1951)  (Frankfurter,  J.,  concurring  in
the judgment); see also Aleinikoff,  supra note  24,  at 984.
27.  See, e.g.,  A.  BICKEL,  Ti  LEAST  DANGERous BRANCH  23-28  (1962).
28.  See Schor,  478  U.S.  at  863-65  (Brennan,  J.,  dissenting);  see also Redish,  Legislative
Courts, Administrative Agencies,  and the  Northern  Pipeline Decision,  1983  DUKE L.J.  197,
221-22  (1983).  For similar concerns  in the free speech  area,  see,  e.g.,  J.  ELY,  DEMOCRACY  AND
DISTRUST  106-16  (1980).
29.  285 U.S.  22  (1932).
30.  Id. at  86-88  (Brandeis,  J.,  dissenting);  accord Hart,  The Power of Congress to Limit
the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66  H~Av.  L. Rnv.  1362,  1372-73
(1953).
31.  Bator,  supra note  1, at 269-70.
32.  Id.
33.  Crowell, 285  U.S.  at 57;  Dreyer v. Illinois,  187 U.S.  71,  84  (1902).  Professor Monaghan
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To  explain  more concretely  why  the  question  is  important,  assume  that
a  state  agency  hearing  workers'  compensation  claims  against  employers
recognizes  every  conceivable  attribute  of  procedural  fairness.  Suppose,
moreover,  that  judicial  review  of  agency  decisions  is  precluded,  but  the
agency  itself provides  an  internal  appeal  to  an  administrative  review  body
composed  of  three  lawyers  serving  ten-year  terms.  For  purposes  of  due
process-of ensuring  procedural  fairness  before  a competent  and  impartial
adjudicator-it  is  hard to  distinguish  review  by  lawyers  whose  institutional
title is "state  court of appeals"  from review by lawyers titled "administrative
appeals  board."  It  is true  that the  state political  branches  might  in theory
exercise pressure  over the appeals board. But had the state provided judicial
instead of administrative review,  the political  branches might  have exercised
pressure over  state  court  judges,  who  are  not required  by the  due  process
clause  to  have  tenure  and  salary  protection.14  Thus,  Brandeis'  famous
statement  in  Crowell that  "under  certain  circumstances,  the  constitutional
requirement  of due process  is  a requirement  of judicial  process ' 35 seems to
me  unpersuasive  in this  context.36
has  noted  that  several  federal  constitutional  provisions  applicable  to  the  states-the  bill  of
attainder clause (whose applicability does  not depend upon the emergence of "incorporation"),
the sixth amendment's  jury trial right,  and the right to be  free from  (some) searches absent  a
judicial determination of probable  cause-presuppose  the existence  of a state judiciary. Mon-
aghan,  First Amendment  "Due Process,"  83  HAsv.  L.  REv.  518,  524  n.23  (1970).  But  that
presupposition,  in  my  view,  should  not  cast  doubt  upon  the  validity  of  state  institutional
arrangements  which,  though unfamiliar  in  1789,  provide a  fair and unbiased  hearing before  a
competent  administrative  tribunal  rather  than  a court.
34.  Palmore  v.  United  States,  411  U.S.  389,  410  (1973).  But  cf. Redish  &  Marshall,
Adjudicatory Independence and the  Values of Procedural  Due Process, 95 YAE L.J. 455,  498
(1986)  (contending  that where  state is  a party to  a case involving a liberty or property interest,
use  of untenured  state judges  violates  due process).
35.  Crowell, 285  U.S. at 87  (Brandeis,  J.,  dissenting).
36.  I  do not wish  to be  understood  as  doubting the  existing strong presumption  in  favor
of state judicial  review of state administrative  action,  at least  in light of current  institutional
arrangements and  traditions. To say that state agencies might be as competent and disinterested
as  state  courts  does  not mean  that they are.  Nor do  I  dispute that there  is  authority  beyond
that in Justice Brandeis'  dissent in Crowell suggesting that due process requires judicial process.
Perhaps the leading  decision  so  holding  is  Ohio Valley Water Co.  v.  Ben Avon  Borough,  253
U.S.  287  (1920),  where  the Court,  over the  dissents  of Brandeis,  Holmes,  and  Clarke,  ruled
that the due process  clause entitled a utility that had challenged a state rate order as confiscatory
to  the "independent  judgment  as to  both  law  and facts"  of a  judicial tribunal.  Id. at 289;
see also infra note  40;  L.  JAFF-,  supra  note  13,  at  376-89.
Ben Avon is  most celebrated,  or notorious,  for having  required de novo review  of "consti-
tutional facts"-a requirement  that has  not stood the test  of time.  See generally Hart, supra
note  30,  at  1376-77;  Monaghan,  supra note  14,  at  247-54.  Ben Avon  is  weakly  reasoned  in
other respects.  As  Henry Monaghan has  noted,  it appears to  rest on the following  syllogism:
(a) regulation  of rates by legislatures must  be subject  to judicial review;  (b) the rate  order  in
question  is  "legislative"  in nature;  (c)  therefore,  the order  must be subject  to judicial review.
Id. at 252 n.126.  Paul's lecture  demolishes the notion that simple labels  like  "legislative"  and
"judicial"  can  decide  cases;  indeed,  as  Monaghan  notes,  we  might  today  consider  the
administrative  rate order to have been an "adjudication."  Moreover, it may be that the agency
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Now  suppose that  the  initial administrative  decisionmaker  were  a  board
of three  lawyers  appointed  to ten-year  terms,  that the  board's  orders  were
self-enforcing,  and that no  administrative  or judicial  review were  available.
Such  a  scheme  would  be  unusual. 37 But  even  in  criminal  cases,  a  litigant
whose case  has been  fairly decided by an initial tribunal has no right  to  an
appeal.3 8 Notwithstanding what Louis Jaffe calls "the ubiquity of the judicial
imprimatur before  the exercise of official  force," 39 it seems hard to  contend
that  a scheme  providing  a single,  but entirely  fair,  administrative  determi-
nation necessarily  denies  due  process. 40 Nor, in  view  of powerful  questions
that have  been  raised about the desirability of individualized judicial review
in  mass  benefit  programs, 4'  should  we  be  too  quick  to  constitutionalize
judicial  review  in all  of the states-a point that  Paul  echoes.
4 2
in Ben Avon  did  not  provide a  fair  hearing,  so  that due  process  required  judicial  process  as
the  only  way  to  provide  any  fair  hearing  on  the  facts  of  the  case.  Cf. 253  U.S.  at  291
("Plaintiff  in  error  has  not  had  proper  opportunity  for  an  adequate  judicial  hearing  as  to
confiscation.").
37.  See L.  JA'F,  supra note  13,  at 320-94.
38.  See McKane v.  Durston,  153  U.S.  684,  687  (1894).  Though decided  nearly one  hundred
years  ago,  McKane  has  been  reaffirmed  by  recent  Supreme  Court  decisions.  See,  e.g.,
Pennsylvania  v.  Finley,  481  U.S.  551,  555  (1987);  Ross v.  Moffitt,  417 U.S.  600,  606  (1974).
39.  L.  JAFFE,  supra note  13,  at 262.
40.  When  one  adds  to my  simple  example  the prospect  of the agency's  acting  as a  party
as well  as  the adjudicator, and  its  possession  of rulemaking  as well as  adjudicatory  authority,
concerns  about  impartiality  mount. But cf. Shapiro,  APA: Past, Present, Future, 72  VA.  L.
REv.  447,  470  (1986)  (suggesting that courts and  agencies  decided  issues  "in  roughly the same
way,"  and  questioning  the  "idealistic  belief  in  very  good  judges  who  do  not  confuse  their
own  policy  preferences  with those  of Congress  or  with the self-evident  good").  The  Supreme
Court,  however,  has  never  held  that  such  a  combination  of  functions  violates  due  process,
much less intimated  that appropriate  insulation  cannot  avoid  any constitutional  concerns.  See
Withrow v.  Larkin,  421  U.S.  35,  46-55  (1975).
A different example  is  raised by  Justice Scalia's dissent  in United  States v.  Mendoza-Lopez,
481  U.S.  828  (1987).  There,  an  alien  was  convicted  in  federal  court  for  entering  the  United
States  after having  been  deported.  The  Supreme Court  held  that the statutory  scheme,  under
which criminal  defendants  were  precluded  from  attacking the underlying  administrative  order
of deportation,  denied  due process,  at least  where defects  in the administrative  proceeding  had
prevented judicial  review  of the original  deportation  order.
In  dissent,  Justice  Scalia  posited a  state  administrative  agency  that,  after  full judicial-type
administrative  hearings,  published  a list  of unethical  businesses,  and a  state law that made  it
a felony  for  a listed  business to  bribe  agency investigators.  He argued  that it  would not deny
due  process  if  a  listed  business  were  precluded  from  collaterally  attacking,  in  a  bribery
prosecution,  the validity of the administrative  listing,  even  if no judicial review  of that initial
order  had been  available.  Id.  at 848  (Scalia,  J.,  dissenting).
I  believe Justice  Scalia may have won  the argument  about his  hypothetical,  but should have
lost  the war  about how  to decide  Mendoza-Lopez. The majority's  position in Mendoza-Lopez
would have  been  stronger  had it  rested  on  one of two positions.  The  first is that in imposing
criminal  punishment,  a  federal  court  may  not,  consistently  with  article  III,  be  required  to
accept  as  valid  a  legal  determination  made  by  a  federal  non-article  III  tribunal.  See Hart,
supra note 30,  at  1379-83.  The  second-premised  on the  Supreme  Court's  acceptance  of the
lower  courts'  ruling that the original  deportation  hearing violated due process-is that no court
may constitutionally  impose  a  sanction  on  a defendant  who  was  not afforded  a  fair  hearing
by  some  tribunal  as to one  element  of liability.
41.  See J.  MASHAW,  BUREAUCRATIC  JusTIcE:  MANAGING  SOCIAL  SECURITY  DisAarrY Cans
(1983).
42.  Bator,  supra note  1, at 262.
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Indeed,  the  conclusion  that  due  process  does  not  necessarily  require
judicial  process  is  related  to  one  of Paul's  key insights-that  the judicial
and  executive  realms  overlap  and  cannot  be  distinguished  a priori. 4 3  It is
similarly  difficult,  in  determining  whether  a  state  adjudicatory  tribunal
provides  due  process,  to  make  the  inquiry  turn  on  whether  the  label
"judicial"  or  "administrative"  is  a better fit-particularly  since  the federal
constitution  does not  set  forth  characteristics  (like  article  III's  tenure  and
salary protection or its limitation of the federal judicial function to deciding
cases  and  controversies)  that  define  the  state  judiciary.  In  determining
whether  a  state  has  provided  due  process,  what  matters  is  not  abstract
categorizing,  but  rather  whether  the tribunal  provides  a fair  hearing.  That
is  not  always  an  easy  question  to  resolve,  but  it  is,  I  think,  the  right
question to ask.
The  same  due  process  analysis  should  govern  federal  institutions.  If  a
federal  workers'  compensation  scheme  provides  a  fair  hearing  before  a
competent  and  impartial tribunal-for  example,  before  law-trained  judges
serving  ten-year  terms  and  free  from  any  conflict  of interest-it  does  not
deny  due  process.  Thus,  I  part  company  with Paul  when  he suggests  that
article  III  does  not add  to the  due  process  clause  in  requiring  review  in  a
constitutional  court of a federal executive or administrative  determination.
44
Rather,  even when  a federal  tribunal provides  due process,  article  III may
require  the  availability  of  at  least  some  judicial  review  in  an  article  III
tribunal.
One  objection  to  my  emphasis  on  article  III  deserves  attention.  The
objection  arises  from  the  possibility  of state  court  review  of federal  non-
article III tribunals.  Congress has, in general, broad power to decide whether
to  assign  cases  to  federal  or  state  courts.  When  judicial  review  of  the
decision  of a federal non-article III tribunal  is required,  Congress  may give
state  courts the reviewing jurisdiction;45 though state  courts lack tenure  and
43.  Id. at 264.
44.  Id. at 269-70.
45.  Paul does  not discuss  this possibility,  which  he might have viewed  as implausible,  not
only  because  of  likely  resistance  from  the  federal  government,  but  also  because  it  would
exacerbate the existing  lack of uniformity in the interpretation  of federal  law. See Bator,  What
is Wrong  With the Supreme Court?, 51  U.  PrrT.  L.  Rav.  - (1990);  Strauss,  One Hundred
Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court's  Limited Resources  for Judicial
Review of Agency Action,  87  CoLUM.  L.  REv.  1093  (1987).  But  I suspect  he would  not have
doubted the constitutionality  of such  an  approach,  especially  given  his  high  opinion  of state
courts  and  his recognition that article III  review is  a scarce  commodity.
One might  ask,  in light of my earlier  suggestion  of the difficulties  of sharply distinguishing
state  agencies  from  state  courts,  whether  it  follows  that  review  of a  federal  administrative
decision  could  constitutionally  be  assigned  to  a  state  administrative  agency  rather than  to  a
state  court.  The  question  may  be  a  bit  "unreal  and  contrived,"  Bator,  supra note  1, at
270,  but in principle  I  believe  that such  a scheme  could  satisfy  the Constitution.  A contrary
answer  would  require  establishing  some  federal  constitutional  standard  to  differentiate  state
courts  from  other  state  adjudicatory tribunals-a  standard  that,  as just  noted,  does  not  (as
yet) exist.  Moreover,  the cardinal value protected  by article III's tenure and salary protections-
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salary  protection,  they  share with  article  III courts  a freedom  from control
by  the  federal  political  branches. 46  This  much  is  broadly  accepted.47  But,
the  objection  goes,  it  is  difficult  to  find  that  article  III's  requirements
governing federal judges'  salary  and  tenure  protection  can  be  satisfied  by
state  court  review.  Wouldn't  it be  far  easier  to  find  due process  to be the
source of the constitutional right to judicial review,  with article III requiring
only  that if the  reviewing  forum  is  a  federal tribunal,  it must  be  a  federal
constitutional  court?
This  objection  has some  force,  but there  are,  I  believe,  two  responses  to
it. The  first focuses  on article  III  as a whole rather  than on the tenure  and
salary language  alone.  Article  III  is  the source  of the  following  two prop-
ositions:  federal  (but not  state) judges  must have tenure  and  salary protec-
tions,  and  Congress  need  not  create  (at least  inferior) federal  courts.  The
value  most  consistent  with  those  two  propositions  is  adjudication  by  tri-
bunals  free  from  the  control  of the  federal  political  branches.  That  value
is  threatened  by  adjudication  in article  I  tribunals  that is  final,  but  not  by
adjudication  subject  to  adequate  review  by  federal  constitutional  or  state
courts,  both of which  are insulated  from  direct control  by  Congress  or the
President.
The  second  response  to  the  objection  highlights  one  last  oddity  of the
suggestion that due process  is  the source  of a constitutional  right to judicial
review.  Consider again a hypothetical federal workers'  compensation  agency.
It  is  accepted  that  an  employer  subject  to  an  order  to  pay  compensation
has  a constitutional  right to judicial review,  at least  as to questions of law,4
adjudicatory  independence  from  federal  political  control-does  not  call  for  any  distinction
between  state courts  and state  agencies.  In a particular  case, a state agency's  procedures might
not satisfy  due  process,  but  nothing  precludes  designing  and  staffing a  state agency  so that it
provides  an  entirely  fair  hearing.
46.  See  Krattenmaker,  Article 111 and Judicial Independence:  Why  the New  Bankruptcy
Courts are Unconstitutional, 70  GEo.  L.J.  297,  304  (1981).
47.  See generally P.  BATOR,  D.  MELTZER,  P.  MisHInN & D.  SHAPiRo,  HART & WEcaSLER's
TH  FEDERAL  COURTS  AND  Tan  FEDERAL  SYSTEM  382  (3d  ed.  1988)  [hereinafter  HART  &
WECHSLER].  Even  revisionist  arguments  that the  Constitution  does require  the establishment
of either  original  or  appellate  federal  court jurisdiction  oversome  subset  of cases within  the
federal  judicial  power  concede  (albeit  at  times  grudgingly)  the  constitutionality  of  assigning
those cases  to the state courts,  so long  as their decisions  are subject to  Supreme  Court review
via certiorari.  See,  e.g.,  Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article IM." Separating  the Two  Tiers
of Federal Jurisdiction, 65  B.U.L.  Rsv.  205,  218-19  (1985);  Sager,  Foreword: Constitutional
Limitations on  Congress' Authority to  Regulate the Jurisdiction of the  Federal Courts, 95
HARv.  L.  REv.  17,  44,  52-57  (1981).  Thus,  acceptance  of  these  arguments  would  not  cast
doubt  on  the  constitutionality  of  Congress'  making  the decisions  of  federal  non-article  III
tribunals  reviewable  in state rather  than  federal  courts.
48.  See,  e.g.,  Hart,  supra note 30:
Q.  The  Crowell case  also  has  a  dictum  that  questions  of  law  ...  must be
open  to judicial  consideration.  [Has  that]  statement[]  stood up?
A.  If I can speak broadly  and loosely,  I'll say yes  ....  Shutting off the courts
from  questions  of law determinative  of enforceable  duties was  one of the things
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and  as just noted,  such review  might  come in a state court.  If this right  to
review were based  on the due process  clause,  then  one would have to assert
that  (1) an  adjudication  before  untenured  federal  adjudicators  denies  due
process,  no  matter how  fair the  hearing  and the  tribunal  may  be,  but  (2)
an  adjudication  before  untenured  state  judges,  even  if they  are  no  more
competent  or  impartial49  and  afford  no  fairer  an  opportunity  to  present
evidence  and  argument,  complies  with  due  process.  This  oddity  disappears
if the  right  to  review  is  premised  on article  III,  for its  tenure  and  salary
provisions clearly treat untenured federal and state adjudicators  differently.so
And  thus  understood,  constitutional  doctrine  requiring  judicial  review  of
federal  administrative  agencies  will not  needlessly  restrict  the ability  of the
states to experiment with approaches  to administrative adjudication  in which
courts  play  a less  central  role.
III.
The third  point I would  like to  address  is  the  relevance  of the  argument
just  made-that  due  process  is  not  the  appropriate  doctrine  on  which  to
base  a  right  to  review  of  decisions  by  non-article  III  tribunals-to  the
question whether  consent of all parties to  federal non-article III adjudication
should  be honored.  Paul does not devote  much attention  to that  question,
but consent has  been invoked  by the  Supreme Court  in its two  most recent
legislative  courts  decisions  as  one  reason  for upholding  the tribunals  there
at issue, 51 and  by the courts  of appeals  in their  consistent  validation of the
assignment  of  civil  cases  to  federal  magistrates  with  the  consent  of  the
parties.1
2
Some  commentators  have suggested  that  due  process  protects  the  rights
of  individual  litigants,  and  hence  they  can  waive  that  protection,  while
article III protects  the independent status  of the judiciary,  a protection that
litigants lack standing to yield.53 The opinion in Commodity Futures Trading
Yakus  [v. United  States,  321  U.S.  414  (1944)]  assumed  that Congress could  not
do.
Id. at 1377.
49.  State court judges,  though insulated  from the federal  political  branches  (unlike unten-
ured  federal  adjudicators),  are,  of  course,  not  insulated  from  state  political  influence.  The
threat to ideals  of impartiality  from possible political  influence thus seems,  in a gross  way, to
be  equivalent.  Indeed,  one might  suggest  that the smaller  scale  of state government  increases
the  visibility  of,  and  likelihood  of  efforts  to  exert  political  influence  over,  any  particular
adjudication.
50.  Fof consideration  of one additional  objection to my argument,  see  infra note 68.
51. See  Commodity  Futures  Trading  Comm'n  v.  Schor,  478  U.S.  833,  848-50  (1986);
Thomas  v.  Union Carbide  Agric.  Prods.  Co.,  473  U.S.  568,  584  (1985).
52.  See  HART & WECHSLER,  supra note 42,  at 472 and cases  cited therein.
53.  See Note,  Federal  Magistrates and the  Principles of Article  III,  97  HARv.  L.  REv.
1947,  1952-54  (1984);  Note, Article III Limits on Article I Courts: The  Constitutionality of
the Bankruptcy Court and the 1979 Magistrate Act,  80  CoLTm.  L.  REv.  560,  592-96  (1980)
[hereinafter  Note, Article III Limits].
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Commission  v.  Schor 4  presented  a  variation  on  this  theme:  article  III
protects  both the structural  role of the independent  judiciary and  the rights
of litigants  to  impartial adjudication.
To the  extent that  [the] structural  principle is implicated  in a given  case,
the  parties  cannot  by consent  cure the  constitutional  difficulty  for  the
same  reason  that the  parties  by consent  cannot  confer  on  federal courts
subject-matter  jurisdiction  beyond  the  limitations  imposed  by  article
III  ....  [Those]  limitations  serve  institutional  interests  that the  parties
cannot  be  expected  to  protect.5
Paul argues  that  article  III  sets  forth  structural  and  political  ideals  rather
than  private  rights,  though  without  specifically  indicating  the  implications
of that argument for the validity of consensual  non-article III adjudication.
6
To me,  trying  to  separate these  two  interests  is  a bit like  asking whether
antibiotics  are  administered  in  order  to  eliminate  bacteria  or  reduce  pain.
Clearly,  both purposes are at work,  and achieving  the first leads to  achieve-
ment  of  the  second.  Article  III  protects  the  rights  of  litigants  precisely
through  its  creation  of judicial  independence
5 7  just  as  more  generally  a
system  of separated  powers  is  thought  to promote  individual  liberty.'  Nor
is it odd that a constitutional  provision furthering a structural  interest might
be protected  (or left unprotected)  by the actions  of a litigant. The litigation
of separation  of  powers  and  federalism  issues  is  ordinarily  undertaken  by
private  litigants. 9 To take just one example,  Presidents  for years  had taken
the  position  that  the  legislative  veto  was  unconstitutional,  but  that  device
was incorporated  in nearly 200 statutes until Immigration and Naturalization
Service v.  Chadha, 60 where  a private  litigant  came  along  to  press  and  win
a separation  of powers  challenge.
The argument  about  consent  can  be put  differently.  There  is  no  barrier
to  requiring litigants  to exhaust remedies  before  an administrative  tribunal,
so  long  as  an  article  III  court  retains  full  power  to adjudicate  de novo  all
issues  of fact  and  law.  But we  do  not  require  a litigant to  appeal  from  an
54.  478  U.S.  833  (1986).
55.  Id. at 850-51.
56.  Bator,  supra note  1, at 259.
57.  The  point  is made  quite  clearly  by  Hamilton  in  THE  FEDERALIST  No.  78.  See  also
Kurland,  The  Constitution and the Tenure of Federal Judges. Some Notes from History, 36
U.  Cm. L.  REv.  665,  698  (1969).
In  his  dissent  in  Schor, Justice  Brennan  similarly  argued that the two  interests are  difficult
to  disentangle.  From  that  starting  point,  he reached  a  conclusion-that  the validity  of non-
article  III  adjudication  is  unaffected  by  litigant  consent-diametrically  opposed  to  the view  I
sketch  here.  See 478  U.S.  at  867.
58.  See Myers  v. United  States,  272  U.S.  52,  293  (1926)  (Brandeis,  J.,  dissenting);  THE
FEDERAUST  No.  47  (J.  Madison).
59.  See  HART  &  WECHSLER,  supra note 47,  at  175;  J.  CHOPER,  JUDICIAL  REVIEw  AND  THE
NATIONAL  POLITICAL  PROCESS:  A  FUNCTIONAL  RECONSIDERATION  OF THE  ROLE  OF  THE  SUPREME
COURT 209-10  (1980);  Hart, Book  Review,  67  HARv.  L. REv.  1439,  1461  (1954).
60.  462 U.S.  919  (1983);  see id. at 977  (White,  J.,  dissenting).
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administrative  determination,  whether  or not  it has any  binding  effect.6'  It
is  hard  to  see  why  the  consent  of  the  litigants  to  be  bound  by  the
determination  of a non-article  III  tribunal  should  be  valid  after,  but can
never be valid before,  the adjudication.  In either case, that consent provides,
if  not complete,  at least very considerable  reason to doubt that the tribunal
poses  a serious threat  to the ideal  of federal adjudicatory  independence.
2
There  remains the argument  that just as  consent cannot permit article  III
courts  to  hear  cases  outside  their  subject  matter  jurisdiction,  so  consent
cannot validate adjudication by non-article III tribunals. 63  But subject matter
jurisdiction  is  not  a  self-defining  term,64  and  the  tradition  that  defects
cannot  be  waived  is  not  an  unshakable  axiom  but  a  purposive  doctrine
s .
6
61.  I do  not assign  great  significance  to  the question  whether  an  agency's  orders  become
binding absent judicial  enforcement,  or more generally to a distinction  between  administrative
agencies  and legislative courts  for purposes of article III.  Accord Katz, Legislative Courts, 43
HARV.  L.  REV.  894,  920  (1930);  Redish,  supra note  28,  at 214-19;  Fallon,  supra note  10,  at
928.  Cf. Karst,  Federal Jurisdiction Haiku, 32  STAN.  L.  REV.  229,  230  (1979).  Professors
Currie  and  Krattenmaker  disagree,  arguing  that the  inability  of an  administrative  agency  to
enforce  its own  orders  makes its  adjudication  more justifiable  than  adjudication  by legislative
courts with the power to  enter judgment.  See Currie, Bankruptcy Judges and the Independent
Judiciary, 16  CREIGHTON  L.  REv.  441,  456  & n.85  (1983);  Krattenmaker,  supra note  46,  at
308-09. In fact, however,  orders of some agencies-for  example, the Federal Trade Commission
and  the Interstate  Commerce  Commission-are  self-enforcing.  See  15  U.S.C.  § 45(g)  (1982);
49  U.S.C.  § 10322(e)  (1982).  To  be sure,  parties  aggrieved  by those  orders  have  the right  to
judicial  review.  But  so  long  as review  is  available  in any  event,  the question  whether  orders
are  self-enforcing  reduces,  in practical  terms,  to  the question  of which  party  has  the burden
of  seeking  judicial  review.  That  is  admittedly  a  difference,  but  not  one  that  seems  to  me
significant  in  considering  whether and  to  what  extent the  Constitution permits  initial  adjudi-
cation  in a  non-article  III  tribunal.  See generally Redish,  supra note 28,  at  217-18.
Indeed,  the argument that delegation  to non-article III tribunals is  more easily justified  when
they  lack  power  to enter  binding  orders  is  not  unrelated  to  the conception  of  administrative
agencies  as  adjuncts of  article III  courts.  Paul's  criticism  of that conception  is,  in my view,
unanswerable.  See Bator,  supra note  1, at 252-53.
62.  To be sure,  in some  instances  we  may  doubt  the validity of the  consent given  before
the  non-article  III  adjudication  occurs,  as in  that situation  the unwillingness  to consent  may
carry  a  price.  See  Geras  v.  Lafayette  Display  Fixtures,  Inc.,  742  F.2d  1037,  1042  (7th  Cir.
1984)  ("If a  litigant were required  to walt ten years  for  a trial  before an Article  III judge in
lieu  of a  prompt  trial  before  a  magistrate,  we  would  have little  difficulty  finding  that  the
constitutional  grant  of jurisdiction  had  been  frustrated.").  Compare 28  U.S.C.  § 636(c)(2)
(1982)  (including  provisions  designed  to  provide  some  assurance  that  a litigant's  consent  to
having a federal  magistrate  preside over  a civil trial  is voluntary).  And  there is some basis  for
fear of excessive  judicial  willingness  to treat  consent as  valid.  See, e.g.,  Geldermann,  Inc.  v.
C.F.T.C.,  836 F.2d 310 (7th Cir.  1987) (broker required to participate in arbitration proceedings
as condition  of doing  business; court  upholds his "consent"  to waive  article III adjudication),
cert. denied, 109  S. Ct.  54  (1988).  Thus,  courts  will  have to wrestle  with the vexing  question
whether a particular expression  of consent should be deemed  voluntary. See generally Sullivan,
Unconstitutional  Conditions, 102 HARv.  L.  REV.  1413  (1989).
63.  See, e.g.,  Schor, 478  U.S.  at 851;  Note, Article  I  Limits, supra note 53,  at 595-96.
64.  See Currie,  supra note  61,  at 460  n.108;  Note,  Article III Limits, supra note  53,  at
595  n.221.
65.  See AMERICAN  LAW INsTrrrUE,  STUDY OF  Tm  DIVISION  OF  JURISDIcnoN  BETWEEN  STATE
AND  FEDERAL  CoURTs  §  1386  (1969)  (proposing  that  neither  the  parties  nor  the  court  may
raise  jurisdictional  defects,  including  lack  of  subject  matter  jurisdiction,  after  the  beginning
of trial except  in limited  circumstances).
1990]INDIANA  LA W JOURNAL
Two  Massachusetts  residents  cannot  agree to  federal  court  adjudication  of
their  state  law  contract  action  because  the states  have an interest in  federal
non-interference  that  the  litigants  are  unlikely  to  protect.  In  the  present
context,  however,  the  strategic  interests  of litigants  substantially  coincide
with institutional interests protected by article III.
66 If there were a significant
threat  to  a  tribunal's  adjudicatory  independence,  it  is  unlikely  that  both
sides  would consent  to adjudication  before  it.
Thus,  I  conclude  that  there  is  no  inconsistency  between  an  emphasis  on
article  III  as  the  source  of a  right to  judicial  review  of federal  non-article
III  tribunals  and  a  willingness  to  validate  non-article  III  adjudication  to
which  the  litigants  have  consented.  Given  Paul's  desire  to  construe  article
III so that it does  not stand in the  way of institutional  flexibility and,  more
specifically,  alternative  methods of dispute resolution, 6 7  I would like to think
that he  would  have  agreed.
IV.
My final  comment raises  the question of exactly  what  adoption of Paul's
approach  would  entail.  Though  I  am  persuaded  by  the  thrust  of Paul's
position that Congress  has  broad power  to  avail  itself  of article  I  tribunals
so  long  as  there  is  adequate  judicial  review,  considerably  more  detail  is
needed to turn that position into a workable set  of legal  propositions.  Most
fundamentally,  Paul  leaves  open  large  questions  about  the  necessity  and
scope  of judicial  review.  To take just  one  example,  must  all  cases  decided
by non-article III tribunals-even,  for example,  agency  denials of benefits-
be subject to judicial review?  As to all issues of law and fact?  Paul brilliantly
exposes  the  lack  of coherence  to the  "public  rights"  category  as  set  forth
in  recent  Supreme  Court  decisions,  but  leaves  us  without  a clear  sense  of
whether  he  would  require  article  III  review  of  all  cases  that  have  been
thought  to  fall  within  it-and if so,  as to  what  issues.6
66.  See Currie,  supra note  61,  at 460  n.108.
67.  Bator,  supra note  I,  at 262.
68.  I  infer  from  his  discussion of Murray's  Lessee  v.  Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.,
59  U.S.  (18  How.)  272  (1856),  see  Bator,  supra note  1,  at  246-48,  that  in  his  view  some
determinations by the executive or other non-article III tribunals need not be judicially reviewed.
Paul's suggestion  that judicial review  must  satisfy the  requirements  of due  process, see Bator,
supra  note  1,  at  267-68,  merely  re-locates  the  scope  of  review  issue  under  a  different
constitutional provision.
The  suggestion  does  raise  one  last  question  about  whether  the  right  to  review  should  be
understood  as based  on  due process or  article III.  Henry Hart's famous  dialogue  distinguished
between  the  right  to  review  in  enforcement  cases-in  which  the  government  seeks  to  hurt
someone-and  benefit cases-in  which the government  falls to confer a benefit  upon someone.
Hart,  supra note  30,  at  1386-87.  A  right  to  judicial  review  that  depends  on  whether  the
government is  helping  or hurting  an individual  might seem  to  emerge more  comfortably  from
the due  process  clause,  under  which  the  nature  of the process  required  traditionally  depends
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Formulating a persuasive  account of the constitutional necessity of review,
and its required scope,  over a range of different kinds of government actions
and as to varying kinds of issues  is a task of consummate  difficulty. Among
the knotty problems  is  the  need to  accommodate  the  doctrine of sovereign
immunity,  a  history  accepting  limited  or  precluded  review  in  many  areas,
and the longstanding  rhetoric  about public  rights.  It is not  clear to me that
one can provide  an  account that  satisfactorily  reconciles  the  traditions just
noted  to  an  organizing  constitutional  principle  requiring  judicial  review. 69
Paul's  lecture  does  not  offer  a  solution  to  that  problem  in  all  of  its
complexity.  The  great  virtue  of  his  lecture,  however,  is  not  only  that  it
clears  away  a mass  of debris,  but  also  that,  with  great  illumination  and
style,  it points us  in the  right direction.
on the kind  of interest  affected.
I  think  there  is  considerable  but  not  decisive  force  to  that  argument,  and  I  offer  two
responses.  First,  Hart's distinction  has  been  forcefully  criticized  as  difficult  to  square  with  a
range  of  related  modem  developments-the  vast  increase  in  the  scope  and  importance  of
government  benefits;  the  recognition  of  "new  property"  and  the  decline  of  right/privilege
distinction; and the expansion  of judicial review of administrative  action as a  means  of trying
to  control  the  power  of federal  agencies  operating  under  broad  legislative  delegations.  See
generally Fallon, supra note  10,  at 963-67;  Sunstein,  Standing and the Privatization of Public
Law,  88  CoLUm.  L. Rv. 1432,  1440 n.34,  1447  (1988).  These  developments  are  reflected  in
continuing  suggestions  by  the Supreme  Court  that  complete  preclusion  of  review  in benefit
cases  would raise serious  constitutional  questions.  See, e.g.,  Bowen  v.  Michigan Academy  of
Family  Physicians,  476 U.S.  667,  681  n.12  (1986);  Johnson  v.  Robison,  415  U.S.  361,  366-67
(1974);  see also Bartlett  v.  Bowen,  816  F.2d 695,  697  (D.C.  Cir.  1987)  (2-1  decision)  (holding
that  complete  preclusion  of  constitutional  challenge  to  the  act  under  which  benefits  are
authorized  would constitute  "a  clear  violation  of due process").
Second,  one  who  accepted  the distinction  might  think  control  of  executive  action  by  an
independent  judiciary  (a value  easily  located  in  article  III)  to  be  most  important  when  the
government  threatens  pre-existing  liberty  or  property  interests.  On  this  view,  individual  and
structural  interests  are intertwined,  much  as I  suggested  was true  in discussing  the validity of
consent.
69.  For a comprehensive  and  insightful  recent  discussion  see  Fallon, supra note  10.
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